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TA R A S  F E D I R K O ,  FA R H A N  S A M A N A N I  A N D  H U G H  F. 
W I L L I A M S O N
Grammars of liberalism
Liberalism has been fundamental to the making of the modern world, at times shaping basic assumptions as to 
the nature of the political, and in other cases existing as a delimited political project in contention with others. 
Across its long history, liberal projects have taken a diverse range of forms, which resist easy reduction to a 
single logic or history. This diversity, however, has often escaped anthropological attention. In this introduc-
tion to our special section on Grammars of Liberalism, we briefly trace this historical diversity, interrogate 
anthropological approaches to conceptualising liberalism and offer a broad framework for studying liberalism 
that remains attentive to both continuity and difference. First, we argue for attention to how the political 
claims made by liberal projects unfold at the levels of values, their interrelations (morphology) and the under-
lying rules governing the expression and combination of values, and their intelligibility as liberal (grammar). 
Second, we argue for empirical attention to how values are expressed and liberal projects assembled across 
different social forms. We argue that this approach enables anthropology to grasp the diversity of liberal 
political projects and subject positions while still allowing scholars to approach liberalism critically and to 
interrogate its underlying logics.
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
Liberalism has been fundamental to the making of the modern world. Whether as a 
progressive ideology of individual emancipation, a governmental formation, a justifi-
cation for capitalist expansion or a philosophical tradition informing both imperialism 
and anti‐ colonial resistance, liberal projects have sought to ‘re‐ order the world’ (Bell 
2016) in diverse, if related, ways. Liberal doctrines have informed, and become crys-
tallised through, modern projects of violent rule and civic resistance, and have given 
rise to institutions and ‘code[s] for living one’s life’ (Bayly 2011: 132) that are at once 
both extremely varied and related through the concerns and values that they express. 
As such diversity confirms, liberalism has become ‘the most dominant ethic of our age’ 
(Mahmood 2007: 148).
Within this broad current of modern political culture, anthropology has predom-
inantly focused on ‘late’ liberalism and neoliberalism, conceptualising them as phe-
nomena of the late 20th century, situated within a longer history of global political 
economy and Western political thought. Such efforts beg the question of ‘late’ or ‘neo‐ ’ 
liberalism’s relation to their historic and contemporary relatives. More generally, they 
prompt us to ask how our discipline should approach liberalism as a broader tradi-
tion of thought and practice. This special collection brings together ethnographies of 
‘actually‐ existing’ liberalisms to propose a novel approach to the anthropological study 
of liberal ideologies and social formations. We borrow the epithet ‘actually existing’ 
374     TARAS FEDIRKO ET  AL .
© 2021 The Authors. Social Anthropology published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of European Association of Social Anthropologists
from the state socialist notion of ‘real’ – as opposed to ‘ideal’ – socialism (cf. Brenner 
and Theodore 2002) in order to foreground the complex and often fraught relation 
between ideology and social practice.
We propose to understand these ‘real’ liberalisms as emerging at the intersections 
of historically interrelated traditions of ordinary and expert political thought – ideolo-
gies, in the common sense of the word (see Eagleton 2007; Freeden 1996; Martin 2015) 
– and concrete social formations whose structural characteristics, social organisation 
and day‐ to‐ day construction in the flow of social reality are the traditional stuff of 
ethnography. The contributors to this volume highlight the diversity and intercon-
nection of actually‐ existing liberalisms, moving beyond characterisations of liberalism 
as uniform or monolithic. They explore how particular articulations of liberalism are 
characterised by plural values and how such values inflect and temper one another, and 
gain substance, within specific social relations. Collectively, these contributions offer 
a perspective through which it becomes possible to compare different members of the 
liberal ‘family’.
Va r i e t i e s  o f  l i b e r a l i s m
Liberalism is by no means a new subject of anthropological study. Anthropologists, 
however, have primarily approached liberalism through a narrowly critical (and, 
indeed, self‐ critical) lens, in relation to interrogating the global spread of ‘Western’ 
power. Focusing on democracy, citizenship, humanitarianism, neoliberal govern-
mentality and multiculturalism, to name just a few topics (Ansell 2019), scholars have 
examined liberalism as a ‘dominant ethic’, critiquing the internal contradictions of lib-
eral thought and practice, the ways in which liberal reason informs or becomes embed-
ded in everyday social life, and the violence and exclusions emerging from these (for an 
overview, see Schiller 2015). Even when anthropologists recognise the heterogeneity of 
liberalism ‘on the ground’ (e.g. Ong and Collier 2005), they tend to ultimately equate 
liberalism with a fairly narrow set of ends – namely exploitation and domination. In 
turn, critical accounts have primarily focused on those dimensions of ‘actually existing’ 
liberalism that can be read as means to such ends, taking as given what should be an 
open ethnographic question: how exactly ideologies are formed, come to be articulated 
within and impact on particular social worlds.
Historically however, liberalism, even in its most canonical iterations, has often 
been a demonstrably more plural, socially grounded and self‐ critical endeavour than 
such critical readings would suggest. There is a vertiginous amount of scholarship in 
both political theory and history of ideas, seeking to describe and theorise this diversity 
(e.g. Bell 2014, 2016; Freeden 2009; Jackson and Stears 2012; Losurdo 2014; Trencsényi 
et al. 2018). Several brief examples will suffice to demonstrate the diversity of liberal 
ideas. Despite Adam Smith’s famous call for a ‘system of natural liberty’, in The Wealth 
of Nations (2008 [1776]), for Smith self‐ interest and market competition emerge not 
as ends in themselves. Rather, in his broader work he positions them as vehicles for 
securing interpersonal recognition and moral alignment within a growing, increas-
ingly mediated world, where virtuous deeds and interpersonal rhetoric have less of an 
effect in cultivating civic virtue (Smith 1976 [1759]; also Kalyvas and Katznelson 2008; 
Montes 2019; Tronto 1993). Similarly, Kalyvas and Katznelson (2008) demonstrate 
that for James Madison – often regarded as the father of the American Constitution 
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– personal liberty was both essential and limiting to democracy. While Madison argued 
that personal liberty fostered pluralism in values and interests, which fragmented the 
power of organised factions pursuing domination, he also saw this individualistic 
fragmentation as constraining the capacity of democracies to strive for the common 
good. He thus championed a system of representative democracy, where representa-
tives became legitimate arbiters of, and advocates for, visions of the common good, 
which could justly restrict individual freedom. In a similar vein, Isaiah Berlin’s famous 
distinction between negative and positive liberty (that is freedom from external con-
straint, and freedom to act on one’s intentions), and his defence of the former against 
the latter, is often read as emblematic of the deep liberal belief in the universality and 
paramount ethical importance of the autonomous, individual subject. Yet Berlin’s Two 
concepts of liberty (1969) was also a reflection on the intellectual and historical fram-
ings of liberty that had given rise to National Socialism and Soviet Communism, and 
an argument for tempering universalism – particularly the universalism found within 
liberal theories of human rationality. The relative value placed on either form of lib-
erty was not to be determined in the abstract, but in relation to ongoing historical and 
sociological realities (Anderson 2016; Cherniss and Hardy 2018).
Across these historical instances, liberal projects were defined by a multiplicity of 
values – such as self‐ interest, recognition and moral alignment, in Smith, or rationality 
and positive and negative liberty, in Berlin – which do not simply express a single over-
riding logic but counterbalance, inflect or qualify one another. Contemporary liberal 
ideologies that build on this intellectual heritage are similarly heterogeneous. To rec-
ognise this diversity, as we seek to do, is not to redeem liberalism, but to offer a more 
complex view of it, including how forms of exclusion, exploitation and domination 
arise from or are woven into the sincerely held visions of the good expressed within 
configurations of liberal ideas.
This diversity of liberal ideas emerged and developed within specific historical set-
tings and concrete political struggles, leading to complex patterns of variation, both 
within and across different contexts. For example, the liberalism that became – for a 
while – the dominant political force during the 19th century in Balkan countries such 
as Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria was above all a national liberalism, concerned less 
with the individual liberty that motivated Western European liberals than with securing 
national liberty from surrounding empires (Mishkova 2014). After the First World War, 
in most East Central European countries, now independent from imperial rule, liberal-
ism assumed a new vitality and a greater range, bolstered by the ideological influence of 
the Allies, who promoted a doctrine of self‐ determination, democratisation and broader 
constitutional liberties. The historian Balázs Trencsényi and his collaborators (2018: 67– 
9) identify four types of liberalism present in the Balkans during this period: ‘National 
liberalism’ ‘continued the pre‐ 1918 project of national emancipation and modernization’. 
In contrast, ‘bourgeois liberalism’ defended ‘the political, social, and economic position 
of the bourgeoisie’ (2018: 68). Often opposed to this was a ‘cultural liberalism’ origi-
nating from the same bourgeois milieu but embracing a ‘progressivist’ vision of history, 
liberal democracy and individual rights in ways that were critical of both the bourgeois 
social order and its right‐ and left‐ wing collectivist alternatives. Finally, somewhat at a 
distance from concerns with political order was ‘economic liberalism’ that argued for 
economic efficiency and free markets, e.g. as an economic path to political modernisation 
and liberation. These types of liberalism co‐ existed in tension with one another, some-
times even within the corpus of a single author.
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These historical examples suggest that the continuity and friction between dif-
ferent liberal projects, which unfold across the globe and through history, sometimes 
in contention to one another, demands an empirical perspective that moves beyond 
merely acknowledging that these are all instances of liberal ideologies, or (erroneously) 
seeing the transmission of liberal ideas as only a Western export. Trencsényi et al. sug-
gest that
it is more meaningful to conceive of the East Central European liberal tradition 
[of the time] in terms of several axes with different ideological options (from free 
trade to state intervention, from anti‐ nationalism to the advocacy of homogeniz-
ing nation‐ building, from the critique of mass politics to an enthusiastic praise 
of participatory democracy, etc.) with the neighboring variants sharing many 
features but the two ends of the continuum containing very few common ele-
ments. (2018: 69)
D i f f e r e n c e  a n d  c o n t i n u i t y
We suggest that anthropologists take heed of such connective exercises, and con-
ceptualise liberalisms in a way that is attentive to both their variation and the forms and 
dimensions of their continuity. The existing anthropological literature on liberalism 
and neoliberalism, in fact, has given some attention to the question of continuity and 
variation, but has often privileged the former over the latter, and offered partial con-
ceptualisations of what it is about (neo)liberalism that stays the same or changes across 
different sites. For example, a key strand of work on neoliberalism and ‘advanced lib-
eralism’ has mobilised Michel Foucault’s notion of governmentality – a ‘formula of 
rule’ or technology of power that guides individual and collective conduct by shaping 
subjectivities ‘at a distance’ through various discursive, material and economic tech-
niques (Barry et al. 1996; Rose 1999). In this vision, liberalism operates through, and is 
identified with, systems of thought and knowledge, embedded in a wide range of rep-
resentations, practices and things that regulate how subjects exercise freedom and cul-
tivate themselves (Rose 1993: 288). For Sherry Ortner, however, this presents ‘a 
virtually totalizing theory of a world in which power is in every crevice of life’ (2016: 
50) and leads many anthropologists to identify ‘the liberal subject – the freely choosing 
individual – as the hegemonic form of governmentality in the neoliberal world’ (2016: 
55). Thus, while within this paradigm it is possible to trace techniques of liberal rule, 
or liberal subjectivities, across multiple locales, the problem is that (neo)liberalism thus 
traced is assumed to be the same thing, or to operate in the same ways, across different 
contexts (Ferguson 2009). Our contention, then, is not only that this view is geared to 
find too much continuity in different liberal projects of rule, but also that the anthro-
pology of liberalism should be able to trace continuity of a different kind, and explore 
the social and cultural dimensions of liberalism that exceed technologies and logics of 
rule, or even rule itself as the relevant ‘problem’.1
1 This is indeed what some recent ethnographies, including the work of Collier (2011) and Bear 
(2015), have explored by documenting the institutional, social and material heterogeneity of sites 
through which neoliberal ideas flow. See also Ganti (2014) for an overview.
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In this respect, Coleman and Golub offer an exemplary approach to liberalism, 
which they take ‘to embrace several, sometimes conflicting, historical and present day 
moral and political sensibilities’.2 They suggest that
[b]ecause liberal ideals always take root in a variety of cultural and institutional 
contexts and through the action and reactions of social groups, liberal commit-
ments and critiques of liberalism are not only made tangibly manifest in these 
various contexts but are the very sites for liberalism’s heterogeneous articulation 
and historical transformation. (2008: 257)
Focusing on the re‐ articulation of these core sensibilities – i.e. on what remains liberal 
across heterogeneous sites – this approach effectively allows us to study liberal institu-
tions, techniques of rule, subjectivities and social action, as informed by or expressing 
particular liberal elements. Coleman and Golub, however, say little about whether or 
how these different sensibilities affect (combine with, logically imply or temper) one 
another. In our discussion of examples from the comparative history of liberal thought, 
we have already pointed to the importance of understanding such combinations as 
both non‐ random and historically specific (see Freeden 2009; Gray 1995). We prefer 
to understand the ‘cultural building blocks’ of liberalism as values rather than sensi-
bilities, emphasising their normative weight, emerging from specific historical junc-
tures. More importantly, we suggest that by tracing how such values are configured in 
relation to one another, and how they thus come to inflect one another, we can better 
grasp the diversity of actually‐ existing liberalisms, as well as the historical connections 
among them.
L i b e r a l i s m s ,  c o n n e c t e d
What commonalities and differences exist between different, situated articulations 
of liberalism (whether with regards to their ‘content’, ‘form’ or ‘function’) is an open 
ethnographic question. It would be problematic to state, a priori, some general, univer-
sal liberalism, or to presume a single, overarching logic that infuses all liberalisms. But 
it is equally unproductive to only investigate specific cases without clarifying parame-
ters that can help us understand whether, and how, actually‐ existing liberalisms relate 
to one another, or how they vary.3 Therefore, to guide the study of actually‐ existing 
liberalisms, we propose two sets of conceptual parameters for framing descriptive and 
2 They state that these sensibilities are ‘concerned with a cluster of commitments: protecting prop-
erty and civil liberties, promoting individual autonomy and tolerance, securing a free press, ruling 
through limited government and universal law, and preserving a commitment to equal opportunity 
and meritocracy’ (Coleman and Golub 2008: 257).
3 This kind of endeavour is of course not in itself new in anthropology: scholars of religion – first of 
Islam (Asad 2009), then of Christianity (Robbins 2003, 2014) – had to similarly propose conceptual 
frames that would allow them to talk about their objects comparatively, and through time; they 
have done so against strong anti‐ holist – in Bialecki’s (2012) formulation, ‘nominalist’ – tendencies 
in the discipline, which sought to dissolve both Islam and Christianity into empirical concreteness, 
denying either the need or the possibility of identifying a more general kind of object.
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analytical accounts of liberalism, with each helping to answer a key question: ‘how is 
something or someone liberal’ and ‘who or what is liberal’.
We suggest that the first question – how is something liberal – can be answered 
in relation to three levels of analysis: liberal values, the morphology of how values are 
made to relate to one another and the grammar governing their ‘use’ and legibility, 
which together allow us to trace recombinations of liberal principles across multiple 
contexts, and their diverse practical articulations.
Beginning with values – liberty, individuality, equality, rationality, accountability 
of power etc. – we situate ourselves in a tradition of scholars who see different liberal-
isms as characterised by certain shared or overlapping political ideas, concerns or sen-
sibilities (e.g. Freeden 2009; Gray 1995; Schiller 2013). We focus on such values because 
they ground our analysis in the normative claims about what is, and what is good and 
worthwhile, that undergird liberalism as ideology, and direct our attention to how such 
claims do, or do not, play out across varied social forms.
Recent anthropological scholarship on ‘lived liberalism’ (cf. Hadley 2010) has paid 
much attention to unpacking individual liberal principles: most prominently, auton-
omy/freedom and its derivatives in economic and political life (Englund 2006; Lino 
de Silva and Wardle 2016; Reed 2015), but also tolerance (Dzenovska 2018), civility 
(Thiranagama et al. 2018), conscience (Kelly 2020), non‐ violence (Lempert 2012), pub-
licity (Graan 2016) and reasoned dialogue (Englund 2018), to take several key exam-
ples. This literature demonstrates that it is useful for ethnographers of liberalism to 
trace how people embrace, mobilise or respond to values and their expressions in par-
ticular situations and to follow how these values are woven through everyday practices, 
institutions and material arrangements in uneven ways. Such works also demonstrate 
the importance of deducing liberal values from social practice, rather than simply from 
ideological texts. How values come to be expressed, and how such expression reshapes 
the world as well as the content of values themselves, then, should be investigated eth-
nographically. Illustrating this in her contribution to this collection, Brkovic explores 
how gay‐ rights campaigners in Montenegro take up globalised discourses of sexual 
liberation, not in an effort to claim autonomous freedom, but as a means of eking out 
space for negotiating how sexual self‐ expression and other forms of relationality might 
intermesh.
Values gain their meaning not only ‘through accumulative traditions of discourse, 
and not only through diverse cultural contexts’ (Freeden 1996: 4), but also in relation 
to other values and ideas. Here, we take particular inspiration from the political theo-
rist Michael Freeden, who advocates a ‘morphological’ approach to ideologies such as 
liberalism, arguing that ‘ideologies are distinctive configurations of political concepts’ 
that ‘create specific conceptual patterns from a pool of indeterminate and unlimited 
combinations’ (1996: 4). In this view, different liberal ideologies differ not only in 
terms of the values they promote, but also morphologically, that is, in the ways that 
these values are configured in relation to one another. When taken as part of such con-
figurations, liberal values, and their implications for practice and meaning, cannot be 
read in isolation from one another.4
4 Literary scholar Amanda Anderson (2016) traces how many liberal traditions often embrace indi-
vidual values only partially and sceptically, while locating their moral core in terms of the project of 
mutual inflections and counterbalances that emerge through morphological configurations.
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At the level of morphology, values may be related by different logics, such as hier-
archy and encompassment, domain differentiation, or a relative pluralism or monism 
(cf. Dumont 1994; also Robbins 1994, 2004, 2013; Rio and Smedal 2008; Haynes and 
Hickel 2016), which may prove more or less durable. For example, drawing on field-
work in Northwestern Brazil, at the nexus of local political campaigning and a global 
democratic reform movement, Ansell’s article in this issue explores how the creation of 
distinct domains, each dominated by separate values (such as exchange on the one hand 
and personal bonds on the other), is a common liberal approach to balancing conflict-
ing values (on ‘purification’, see also Keane 2007; Latour 1993; on value spheres cf. 
Weber, in Gerth and Mills 1998 [1946]). In tracing morphologies of liberalism empiri-
cally, ethnographers face the task not only of tracing how values interrelate, but also 
how particular relational logics permeate or connect up various social forms. This is 
illustrated, for example, by Candea in this issue, who explores the ambivalent relation-
ship between procedural roles and ‘thick’ social identities in a French free speech court. 
In the performative interplay between judicial representatives, individual citizens and 
self‐ conscious subjects of publics and counter‐ publics, the appeal to liberal values such 
as detachment and formality are contested, echoed and recast as each party strives to 
assert their own legitimacy and authority in a public space. This is no less true of those 
whom one would expect to be the most secure liberal subjects, the judges, who are 
deeply aware that procedural form is an achievement rather than a given. Taken 
together, these considerations allow for a more nuanced and plural understanding of 
various forms of liberalism, the reach and power they possess, and the different ways 
in which they are re‐ worked through practice. For instance, they allow us to situate 
neoliberalism more particularly as a form of liberalism in which values of economic 
calculation and individual autonomy subsume and structure others, and where the cal-
culation and exchange of value provides the primary means by which social forms are 
imagined to relate to one another.5
We have noted so far that values acquire their meaning and weight within particular 
social contexts, and in relation to one another. But they also make demands on thought 
and practice, requiring actors to work out how best to realise them given their partic-
ular circumstances. Such demands, at least partly, stem from conventions, rules and 
interpretations that develop around values and how they relate. We call these grammar, 
building on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as a ‘grammatical inves-
tigation’ (developed in Philosophical Investigations 2010 [1953]; for a commentary, see 
Baker and Hacker 2009: 55– 67). From this perspective, tracing the grammar of a prop-
osition ‘does not involve decomposing [it] into simple constituents, but rather laying 
bare the web of connections, compatibilities and incompatibilities, implications and 
presuppositions’ that make such propositions intelligible (Baker and Hacker 2009: 59). 
When it comes to liberalism, then, ‘grammar’ refers to the implicit and explicit ‘rules’ 
by which liberal values, and their configurations, become intelligible as liberal. Take 
‘liberty’ as a key value, for instance. As we have seen, liberty might be imagined in 
5 Historians of neoliberal thought (e.g. Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Slobodian 2018) note that neolib-
eralism was a reformulation of economic liberalism, marked by a set of principles (such as making 
things and relations calculable, a particular framing of state– market relations, etc.) that have political 
connotations and goals, but that are narrower than the wider range of political principles that have 
historically been central to political liberalism. Slobodian (2018) specifically points out that neolib-
eralism departed from 19th‐ century laissez‐ faire liberalism (hence the self‐ designation ‘neo‐ ’) and 
developed as an exercise of limiting democratic control over the economy.
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relation to individuals, markets or collectives (such as the nation). Morphologically, it 
might be imagined as subordinating all other values, or as tempered or constrained by 
them. Yet for liberty to remain intelligible as such, virtually all liberal projects frame 
it in opposition to some notion of constraint – whether imperial oppression, poverty 
or the dictates of the state – revealing an underlying grammatical rule for how liberty 
might be re‐ imagined. As with language, such grammar is not unchanging, but is estab-
lished through collective patterns of use, which shift gradually and iteratively across 
different, situated moments of expression. Grammar, too, is a matter of perspective. 
What is accepted as grammatical by one actor may be dismissed by another as nonsen-
sical; the ‘rules’ of liberalism (and who gets to write them) may appear very different 
from within the ivory tower, the halls of government or the picket line.
As with values and relations among them, people perceive and reflect on such 
grammars and draw them into their own ethical projects and political struggles (see 
contributions by Ansell, Fedirko and Morningstar), such as when they attempt to dis-
tinguish the liberal from the illiberal, the democratic from the undemocratic, and so on, 
and to use such distinctions to stake out political positions. In this issue, Morningstar 
describes a set of such tensions that are brought to the surface by politically inflected 
art performances in contemporary Dublin, Ireland, where the question of what counts 
as legitimate and effective criticism in the liberal democratic public sphere is hotly 
contested. Here, the artists’ attempts to engage through their work in ‘parrhesiastic’ 
critique are refused by their audiences, who do not recognise the truth‐ telling value of 
artists’ opaque performances, and judge them to have misused their privileged position 
to make esoteric art understandable only to a very limited public.
The work of the Late Liberalism collective, around the University of Chicago, 
provides an important – if partial – example of how a grammatical analysis of liberalism 
might look within anthropology. Focusing especially on aspects of calculative ratio-
nality within liberalism, such as utilitarian ethics, they trace the surpluses and outsides 
created by such reasoning – the necessary abandonment of certain people and beings to 
violence and dejection as a corollary of projects purporting to be for the common good 
(Povinelli 2011). In order to remain a credible value within liberal frameworks valuing 
moral autonomy and pluralism, calculative rationality, then, has historically necessi-
tated a corresponding account of redemption, frequently cast in terms of discourses 
of sacrifice and sacrificial love, and a future‐ perfect account of justification – what will 
have been justified from a later perspective (Vogler and Markell 2003; Povinelli 2009, 
2011; cf. Asad 2003). By analysing abandonment and redemption as necessary entail-
ments of liberal values of calculation, Povinelli and colleagues begin to interrogate not 
just calculation as a value, but its historical parameters of intelligibility within the lib-
eral project. We propose a similar analytical approach, but one that attends to interwo-
ven configurations of values and to a wider scope of variability. In this issue, Fedirko 
interrogates journalists’ struggle over autonomy in Ukrainian TV news production, 
where autonomy is valued as freedom to pursue creative work without managerial or 
censorial interference, even in the case of a self‐ described TV censor. Fedirko examines 
how his interlocutor’s pursuit of a liberal vision of journalistic professionalism within 
an oligarchically dominated political economy of media in Kyiv leads her to practical 
decisions that are not intelligible as either professional or liberal to those self‐ avowed 
liberals whose work is made possible by Western democracy promotion grants.
To address the second question – ‘who or what is liberal’ – we propose that eth-
nographers investigate the social forms that underpin, express or are shaped by liberal 
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ideologies. This entails investigating the social organisation of liberal projects, their 
material culture and infrastructures, and the actors who invoke or who are addressed 
by liberal values, whether or not they recognise themselves as ‘liberals’. Such actors 
vary, from global capitalist elites, the educated urban middle classes who constitute 
centrist majorities in hegemonic liberal democracies in the North, to groups on the 
global periphery who take up liberal values such as liberty or equality to contest or 
make claims on dominant structures of power. From this perspective we might explore, 
for instance, how specific elements of liberal ideologies are substantiated (or not) by 
relations of power and production, and how such relations condition people’s differ-
ential access to the flow of social value expressed or justified in liberal terms. Such 
investigations ground liberalism in messy, plural social worlds, and in doing so move 
our understanding of liberalism beyond a highly idealised or abstracted framework. In 
this collection, for example, Szymańska‐ Matusiewicz explores how two generations 
of Vietnamese activists living in Poland have campaigned for democratisation in the 
context of post‐ Cold War Eastern European geopolitics. She reveals how core under-
standings and values of democracy transform as the particular social networks and 
geopolitical dynamics that activists are embedded in change over time. These evolv-
ing relations, Szymańska‐ Matusiewicz argues, shape the possibilities and limits of 
the Vietnamese ‘diasporic liberalism’ both in relation to Vietnamese politics and an 
increasingly illiberal Poland.
P r o v i n c i a l i s i n g  l i b e r a l i s m
In linking these different dimensions of inquiry, contributors to this special collection take a 
differentiated and grounded approach to actually existing liberalisms, refusing to take liberal 
ideology for granted as something that necessarily pervades social life. Interrogating values, 
morphology and grammar keeps the focus on the distinct political claims liberalism makes 
on the world, while analysing social forms allows us to trace how such values come to be 
expressed in varied and differentiated ways, within particular contexts. Candea’s analysis 
of the ‘bleak liberalism’ in a French free speech court and Brkovic’s ethnography of gay 
men in Montenegro demonstrate the fragility and ambivalence of liberal commitments in 
relation to various situated tensions and constraints. In a similar way, Morningstar explores 
how the value and effectiveness of critical truth‐ telling is highly dependent on the web of 
social relations and mutual understandings forged (or not) between artists and publics in 
Dublin. Morningstar’s analysis demonstrates that liberal values can be highly contingent 
even in contexts where it is often argued that liberalism provides the ‘basic cultural postu-
lates’ (Freeden and Fernández‐ Sebastián 2019: 1) that create the very (secular) political space 
in which liberal, conservative and other ideologies vie for power (Asad 2003). In contrast, 
in contemporary Ukraine, Fedirko traces yet another framing of ‘free speech’, contingent 
not on the relation between journalists and publics but on those between journalists and 
oligarchic patrons – in a context where liberal projects are not hegemonic and less ‘thickly’ 
institutionalised (cf. Bayly 2011). Despite their differences, however, all these contexts are 
connected, not least through the historical diffusion of liberal ideas, institutional forms, 
texts, objects and infrastructures that are imposed, adopted and translated in various ways 
(e.g. Wedel 2001). Articles by Ansell and Szymańska‐ Matusiewicz (this issue) explore such 
processes and consequences of disseminating and ‘translating’ liberal understandings of 
democratic politics in Northwestern Brazil and among the Vietnamese diaspora in Poland, 
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respectively. As an ideology, liberalism can inform explicit institutional design, and also per-
meate and shape subject‐ making and intimate personal relations (e.g. Gal 2005); but as the 
contributions to this collection demonstrate, whether it does, how it does, and how different 
instances of it doing so differ across social and cultural space are matters of comparative eth-
nographic investigation. Responding to the programme we lay out in this introduction, the 
contributors draw on different elements of our proposed framework, demonstrating how 
it can bring distinct ethnographic studies into the common project of an anthropology of 
actually‐ existing liberalisms. In her afterword, Dzenovska offers further reflections on the 
themes that run across these articles.
The approach developed in this special issue not only pluralises liberalism but also 
points to the varied political and ethical status such liberalisms might hold. It becomes 
possible, then, to simultaneously address liberalism as a dominant form of power and 
as a reflective project, a form of rebellion or an ambivalently received import, without 
losing sight of the genealogical connections and differences between these different 
instances. Liberalism can thus be recognised as a vehicle for local change and contes-
tation without its presence in non‐ Western contexts being read, by default, as proof of 
a sweeping global homogenisation, or such change being read in teleological terms. In 
turn, the move to particularise liberalism allows us to put it in its place. Chakrabarty 
(2008) has famously called on anthropologists to ‘provincialize’ Europe, resisting nar-
ratives of linear progress or singular rationality. Anthropologists have largely done so 
by exploring the richness of life in non‐ European locales, revealing alternative con-
structions of history, value and progress, and the ways in which these have been eroded 
by European influence. However, the inverse move is possible, indeed necessary: we 
might also provincialise Europe by unpacking the particularity, unevenness and situ-
atedness of its own purportedly universal institutions; we might trace how claims to 
(liberal) universality are produced as a social fact, and analyse the grounds on which 
they falter. In doing so, we may arrive at a more nuanced, situated account of liberal-
ism’s power and spread, while also beginning to uncover the ever‐ evolving grammati-
cal parameters that make this reach and variety possible in the first place.
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Grammaires du libéralisme
Le libéralisme a joué un rôle fondamental dans la construction du monde moderne, façonnant 
parfois des hypothèses de base sur la nature du politique, et dans d’autres cas, existant en tant 
que projet politique délimité en conflit avec d’autres. Au cours de sa longue histoire, les projets 
libéraux ont pris des formes diverses, qui résistent à une réduction facile à une seule logique 
ou histoire. Cependant, cette diversité a souvent échappé à l’attention anthropologique. Dans 
cette introduction à notre section spéciale sur les « grammaires du libéralisme », nous retraçons 
brièvement cette diversité historique, nous interrogeons les approaches anthropologiques de la 
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conceptualisation du libéralisme et nous proposons un cadre general d’étude du libéralisme qui 
reste attentif à la fois à la continuité et à la différence. Premièrement, nous plaidons pour que 
l’on s’intéresse à la manière dont les revendications politiques des projets libéraux se déploient 
au niveau des valeurs, de leurs interrelations (morphologie) et des règles sous‐ jacentes régissant 
l’expression et la combinaison des valeurs, ainsi que leur intelligibilité en tant que libérales (gram-
maire). Deuxièmement, nous plaidons pour une attention empirique à la manière dont les valeurs 
sont exprimées et les projets libéraux assemblés à travers différentes formes sociales. Nous sou-
tenons que cette approche permet à l’anthropologie de saisir la diversité des projets politiques 
libéraux et des positions des sujets tout en permettant aux chercheurs d’aborder le libéralisme de 
manière critique et d’interroger ses logiques sous‐ jacentes.
Mots-clés libéralisme, valeurs, comparaison, néolibéralisme, idéologie
